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NOTE ON ALLOCATION OF JOINT COSTS:
Stepwise reduction of costs proportional to joint savings
by: A.J. van Reeken, Tilburg University.~)
1. Introduction
Recently StAhl analysed the results of a game on coet allocation in
water resources; see StAhl (1982). He introduced seven solution concepts
for obtaining a unique allocation of the total costs of a coalition. He
evaluated these seven concepts using 16 actual game results. I am
interested in his study because of a similar problem: how to allocate
the fixed costs of an information system or computing centre over the
participating departments? Although the solution to such type of pro~
lems is finally a political one, obtained via negotiations, we should
try to find generally accepted allocation principles to support the pol-
itical allocation process. Kleynen and Van Reeken (1982) proposed one
concept that was not among those discussed by StAhl. This note compares
StAhl's solution principles to the latter concept.
2. Fíve principles
There are n parties interested in forming coalitions among each other
for some activity in order to obtain a cost reduction as compared to the
costs of doing the activity on its own. For a grand coalition to be
formed of all N parties (and for each coalition of m~ N) certain prin-
ciples may apply:
1. The F ull Cost principle: payments made by parties total the costs of
the coalition:




E x - c(N),
i-1 1
where xi - payment made by party i
and c(N) ~ costs of grand coalition of all n parties.
2. The Individual Rational~ principle: payments made by party i are
not higher than its going alone costs, c(i):
xi t c(i) for all i.
3. The Group Rationality principle: payments made by parties of every
coalition which is smaller than the grand coalition are not higher
than the costs of that coalition on its own:
E xi t c(S) for all S C{1,...,n}
iE S
If allocation of costs satisfies these three principles the solution
belongs to "the core". There may be more solutions in the core.
Two additional principles can be formulated:
4. The Monotonicity principle: if the costs of the coalition go down, no
one should be charged more and if total costs go up, no one shall pay
less:
c(N) ~ c'(N) ~ xi ~ xi for all i.
S. The Causality principle: if a party never contributes to any cost
savings when joining with other parties or coalitions, this party
should not realize any cost savings above his go alone costs:
c(S) f c(i) - c(Sfí) for all S C{1,...,n} ~ xi - c(i).
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3. The concept
The concept "Stepwise reduction of costs proportional to joint savings"
implies a step by step formation of coalítions between two parties;
first between single parties, then among two-party coalitions and
remaining singles and so up to a grand coalition. An example hereafter
will clarify this procedure.
Unlike the Shapley Value (see Shapley (1953)) the former concept fixes
the order in which coalitions can take place.
The order is fixed by the following two principles:
6. The reduction of costs will be proportional to joint savings. (equity
principle).
For illustration purposes suppose that the individual costs of par-
ties A and B are 4 respectively 6 and that the two-party coalition AB
costs 8. Then the joint savings are 20y and so both A and B will ob-
tain a cost reduction of 209~.
7) Each party tries to realize the largest reduction for itself. (econ-
omic principles).
Suppose A has the opportunity to join with B(see above) but also
with C(and that the latter coalition will result in a 30y cost re-
duction; then A will prefer the coalition with C to the one with
B.~).
The stepwise procedure will be explained as follows. Each party first
identifies possible partners, i.e. partners with which a two-party
coalition will lead to lower total costs than when each of the two par`
ties goes alone. Each party then tries to form the two-party coalition
with the largest relative cost reduction. This coalition is formed in-
deed, províded there is a two-party coalition for which this holds for
~) The problem of intransivity (A prefers C, C prefers B and B prefers
A) can not occur, since when
c(AC) ~ c(AB) a nd c(BC) ~- c(AC) then c(BC) c(AB)c(A)fc(B) c(A)tc(B) c(B tc C c A fc C) c B tc C~ c(A)tc(B
and B will prefer C.
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both parties. When such a coalition has been formed, the remaining par-
ties repeat this process until each party has find its partner or
remains single due to lack of profitable partners. So we see a bilateral
coalition formation.
N.B. In the example given by StAhl, there are six possible two-party
coalitions:






So, A, K and L want to join with H; M wants to join with L: T wants to
join with M; and H wants to join with L.
The only two-party coalition for which there is a preference on both
sides, is HL. This coalition is formed. So A will remain single; K and T
will try M; and M will try T. The coalition MT will be formed, and thus
also K will remain single.
Then a new round starts in which the two-party coalitions must be seen
as parties. The process described above is repeated among these parties.
The result of the second round can be either a four-party coalition when
two two-party coalitions join, or a three-party coalition when a two-
party coalítion joins with one that remained single in the first round.
Now there are two ways of calculating the reduction in total costs for
such a three-party coalition (and likewise for the four party coali-
tion):
a) against the sum of the individual costs
b) against the sum of the two-party coalition costs and the individual
cost of the third party.
The rationality principle implies that the two-party coalition will only
accept a three-party coalition when their payment in the three-party
coalition is smaller than in the two-party coalition. Since it can be
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proved~) that for the two-party coalition the reduction sub a is always
smaller than the cumulative reduction sub b, the two-party coalition
will prefer b to calculate the reduction.
N.B. In the example the possibilities are:
A(H L) with a reduction of total costs to 92,06X
HKL - K(HL) 75,91i
since coalitions of MT and A or K; or of H L and MT do not pay. So HL and
K will prefer each other and form a coalition. In the third round HKL is
able to reduce their costs even further by joining with A(reduction to
99,47i) since a coalition with MT will pay less.
Finally in the fourth round the grand coalition will be formed with a
further reduction of costs to 94,86y.
N.B. Pe rcentages are always relative to costs in the preceeding step;
see b above.
The final cost distribution will be as follows:
A: 21,95 x 0,9947 x 0,9486 - 20,71
H: 17,08 x 0,7585 x 0,7591 x 0,9947 x 0,9486 ~ 9,28
K: 10,91 x 0,7591 x 0,9947 x 0,9486 ~ 7,81
L: 15,88 x 0,7585 x 0,7591 x 0,9947 x 0,9486 ~ 8,63
M: 20,81 x 0,9210 x 0,9486 ~ 18,18
T: 21,98 x 0,9210 x 0,9486 a 19,20
83,81
In formu2a:
xi S c(i) ~ II {c S, c}S~ S};
S' v S" - S~ V
~) When c(AB) - a(c(A)fc(B)), 0~ a~ 1, then
c(ABC) c(ABC) c(AB) since c(C) ~ a.c(C).
c(A)tc(B)tc(C ' c(AB)tc(C ' c A tc B
6
V is the set of coalitions S, for which i has decided, and S' and S"
constituted that coalition.
For this concept the values of the three measures of difference (see
StAhl, p. 604) are:
1) The average sum of absolute difference 7,22
2) The average sum of squared differences 23,10
3) The average sum of the relative squared differences 1,67
4. Discussion
The concept presented here satisfied the "full cost" principle, the "in-
dividual rationality" principle and the "group rationality" principle,
and thus produces allocations within "the core". The concept presented
here does not guarantee that every party will become a member of a coa-
lition, or even that only one coalition will be formed.
A coalition, S, is only formed when for two parties, each party being
single or a coalition, S' and S":
(1) c(S) ~ c(S' v S") ~ c(S' ) f c(S")
where S', S" C{1,...,n} and S'n S" -{~}.
However, condition (1) is not sufficient for the coalition S' v S" to be
formed. A necessary second condition is:
(2) c(S' v S" ) c(S' v T' ) c(S' v S" ) c(S" v T" ){c(s' ) f c(s" ) ` c(s' ) f c(T~ ) } n {c(S' ) f c(s" ) ` c(S' ) f c(T") }
for all alternative coalitions T' and T", where
S' , S", T' , T" C {1, ...,n} and S' n T' S {~1}, S" n T" z{~}.
Conditions (1) and (2) are sufficient, provided that S' and S" are
coalitions formed under these conditions, or singles.
The two parties, S' and S", of the coalition, S, are charged:
C(~' v ~tl ) ~ tl
(3) c(S~ )' c(S' ) f c(g~~) resp. c(S") - c(S~ j~vc~s~~)-
So the "full cost principle" is satisfied, since singles bear their go
alone costs, c(i).
From (1) it follows that
(4)
c(S~ ~ S~~)
~ 1.c S -~ c S
Since for singles xi a c(i) and, according to (3) and (4), for coalition
members (5): xi ~ c(i), the "individual rationality principle" i s satis-
fied.
To prove that also the "group rationality principle" is satisfied, three
cases will be distinguished. For each coalition S, a group of inembers,
S' C S ,
a) either formed a(smaller) coalition before forming S,
b) or did not form a(smaller) coalition before forming S, since for all
the members of S' it was not 'individually rational' to do so.
Before proving that also the "group rationality principle" is satisfied,
it is recalled that the concept presented here, does not guarantee the
forming of a grand coalition. So we will prove that the "group rational-
ity principle" is satisfied for each final coalition, S.
For each coalition, S, a group of inembers, S' C S, either formed a
(smaller) coalition before forming S, or did not form a coalition be-
fore.
When they formed a coalition before, we have according to (3) and (4):
xi z x(i E S) ~ x(i E S') for all i E S'.
So, in this case the "group rationality principle" i s satísfied since
the payments Exi are less than the costs of coalition S' on its own.
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When they did not form a coalition before, two cases are distinguished:
a) Condition ( 1) was not satisfied, which implies x(i E S') ~ c(i) for
all i E S', and since xi a x(i E S) ~ c(i) for all i E S, we have
xi s x(i E S) ~ x(i E S') for all i E S'. So, also in this case the
"group rationality principle" i s satisfied. ~
b) Condition ( 1) was satisfied, but condition ( 2) was not satisfied, for
at least one member of S', who first j oined a better alternative S",
before joining S.
This member was single or joined S" as a member of coalition T.
Denoting the costs of each of these two situations with c(T), we
have:
c(S") c(S' )c(T) ~ c(T) } c(S„-T) ~ c(T) ~ c T) f c S'-T)
However, since T finaly j oined S, we also have:
c(S) ~ 1.c S f c S-S
So, the payments of this member T are clearly less than its share in
the costs of the coalition S'.
What about the payments of S'-T? Some of these parties, S"-T, joined
S" with T and are in the same situation as T. The rest, S'-S" is a
single or formed a coalition like S", before joining S.
If S'-S" is a coalition it is in the same situation as S". Since also
the single finally joined S, its payment is less than its go alone
costs. And since its share in the costs of S' would also have been
less than its go alone costs, the payments Exi of the members of S'
are less than the costs of S' on its own. This concludes the proof
that the "group rationality principle" is satisfied.
In his paper StAhl discusses the choice among the three methods~~) that
produce core solutions: Nucleolus, Weak Nucleolus and Proportional
~~) Another choice would be by the demand functions, in case customers
are unwilling to pay any amount for fixed quantity of computer time. See
Thijs ten Raa, "Supportability and Anonymous Equity", Journal of Econ-
omic Theorv, September 1983.
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v
Nucleolus. Since the Nucleolus violates the "Monotonicity principle",
StAhl rejects this method, and since the Weak Nucleolus violates the
"Causalíty principle" he favored the Proportional Nucleolus.
The concept presented here satisfies both additional principles as well.
Since xi - c(i). c(S)~ E c(i), xi varies proportionally with c(S) which
iES
proves that the '~ionotonicity principle" i s satisfied.
When a party never contributes to any cost savings, that party will re-
main single, which satisfies the "Causality principle".
In order to calculate the cost allocation according to this concept the
costs of each possible coalition must be available. When these data are
not available the procedure must be adapted to the available data. At
least the "go alone" costs and the costs of the grand coalition must be
known. In that case every party receives the same percentage reduction.









A comparison of this allocation with the one based on all data, demorr
strates that the data hold information about the contribution to costs
savings by the various parties and coalitions: Both H and L but also K
contribute substantially to the costs savings; the residual savings by
A, M and T are relatively small. The concept of stepwise reduction takes
that into account when this information is available.
The Nucleolus and The Weak Nucleolus do not take this information into
account.
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Furthermore the concept presented here also explains the formatíon of
coalitions. This concept is in line with the experience that "in many
games, a two or three-party coalition was first formed and then a five-
party coalition, before the forming of the grand coalition"; Sbrhl
(1982, p. 605).
The average difference measures for the sixteen games gave values close
to those for the Swedish game: StAhl (1982, table 5).
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